frontexwatch

This text, complimentary to the historical development described in ‘The Quest for the External Border’ summarizes the central developments and examines aspects of a re-definition of the term ‘border’, focussing on the theme of de-territorialisation, i.e. the transformation of the border from its linear geographical meaning to a mobile, fragmented border territory, a ‘border without borders’. Some examples will serve to verify this process in order to continue discussing the interrelated meaning of the border and Frontex.

One of the earliest yet still central example is the European visa system. As already mentioned, the call for a uniform visa system can be traced back as early as the 1989 Palma Document. In 1996 a binding list of states whose citizens needed a visa to enter the EU was agreed upon. Two effects of the forward movement are linked to this visa system, in addition to the further creation of data bases.

The first effect of the forward move is the internationalisation of the EU border controls. Due to the obligation of the transport agencies, above all, the airlines, to refuse entry on board to those without a valid visa, EU border controls are carried out practically at all airports and ports that are directly connected to the EU. The second effect manifests itself in relation to the extension of the visa system. Neighbouring states that do not want to be included in the visa list are to implement at least two measures, the first one being the signing of readmission treaties, the second the introduction of an individual visa system, i.e. the closure of their borders.

Readmission agreements often do not only refer to the citizens of the ’safe’ third countries, but also to transit migrants whose route to Europe allegedly led them through the third country in question. Due to this mechanism the EU is surrounded by a ring of states that can be characterized in the following way: first, these states themselves are often starting points of migration into the EU, yet their citizens can be deported easily on account of the readmission agreements. Second, here the third states act according to a specific interest of their own. The exemption from the visa system facilitates passenger transport and commerce with the EU. Of much higher importance, however, is the fact that these countries do not want to be considered transit zones for migration. This would mean a stronger fortification of the EU-border for them, which would make the transit country a de facto immigration country. Therefore, these states close their borders and render deputy services to the EU.

As a second step, the EU strives to declare the states within the described ring around Europe so-called ’safe third countries’. This means, that in these states there has to exist an asylum system and the Geneva Convention (GC) must have been ratified and put into practice. As seen in the case of Germany, in this way the obligation of having to carry out a lengthy asylum procedure is meant to be dropped. Intead of this, asylum seekers/ migrants who want to be legalized through asylum applications can be deported instantly and have to apply for asylum in the third country outside of the EU.

But the regulation on ’safe third countries’ is not in line with the GC. Here we have a clear violation of international law on the part of the EU. Nevertheless, there is hardly any criticism e.g. from the UNHCR; in contrast, this organisation is helping to carry the asylum discourse into the third countries. Since a working asylum system is a condition for declaring a third state a ’safe’ one, the EU is interested in exporting this special system of residence. This is always carried out under the pretext of protecting refugees and strengthening human rights, and often NGOs that encourage the introduction or improvement of an asylum system are supported on the spot.

These developments can be illustrated with specific examples. One that was already mentioned is the case of Turkey which has been identified as a transit country in the Action Plan Iraque and since then has been increasingly integrated into EU border management. (For a more detailed desciption, see research group TRANSIT MIGRATION 2007). More recent examples are Libya and the Ukraine. Although a unique process can be observed in each country, there is a common structure. In the Ukraine there are so-called Transit Processing Centres where migrants are detained under inhumane conditions and many are not even able to apply for asylum. These camps are maintained by the Ukraine border police (under the jurisdiction of the army), and are a result of a cooperation agreement between the Ukraince and Frontex named ‘Five Borders’ (the name implies the number of the Ukraine’s borders with EU member states). Libya, however, is a so-called Regional Protection Area, an euphemism for the forward move of the external border and the creation of extra-territorial refugee camps. Agreements on the readmission of migrants to Libya were settled mostly on Italy’s initiative. Libya was also granted border-management technology worth several millions of Euros to fortify its southern border against migration. This means that, for refugees, the southern border of the EU is no longer the Mediterranean but has now moved approx. 1,000 km to the south into the Sahara desert (Nsoh 2007, EU Commission 2005).

Through cooperation with the ICMPD in the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue, Frontex plays a role in the forward move of the border. Within the MTM an (interactive) map was created that is meant to reproduce the migration routes through Africa. It is evident that Africa is in the centre and Europa at the very border of the map. The migration routes cut through the African continent and help to create a common European-African territory of threat, in which the basic inconsistencies that North-African states and the EU have in the field of migration policy are to be blurred. In 2007, Frontex carried out a field survey on illegal migration in Libya, focussing on how to support the fortification of the Libyan southern border (Frontex 2007). The situation in the Mediterranean was also discussed and Frontex commented on the Libyan asylum system. Therefore, drawing on the example of Libya, it is possible to show how Frontex is actively involved in the process of moving the border forward.

On a more general level, the role of Frontex can be described as multi-dimensional. In the CIRAM, Frontex identifies transit countries for migration to the EU. This information goes to the EU Commission which uses it to decide on their policies concerning third states. Furthermore, Frontex acts as a provider of technical services involved in arming the displaced border and works toward the export of European border security standards to third countries through immigration liaison officers and common training practices. This function of Frontex in turn is imbedded in a uniform policy of the EU toward neighbouring countries, the above-mentioned European Neighbourhood Policy (Banse et al. 2007).

The de-territoralisation of the border can be seen most clearly in the operations undertaken by Frontex. As an example I will choose the well-known mission ‘Hera’, at the Canary Islands, since Frontex signed an agreement with Mauritania and Senegal that allows Frontex to patrol within the sovereign territory of these countries and intercept refugee vessels. As a result, European war ships operate directly on the coastline of Africa. The effect is that the refugee ships now start leaving the sovereign territory immediately in order to set course for the Canary Islands in international waters. Frontex reports intercepting some of the ships but effectively increases the passengers’ risk of death on the voyage to Europe.

However, the extension of the border area does not only take place towards a topographic exterior, but also and especially within Europe. This would be a topic on its own; therefore I will only touch on it here to show that the European external border rather than a strict seperation of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is in itself a regime that, interacting with discourses on safety and terrorism, works and rules without territorial borders.

In the wake of the Schengen Agreement, many member states started carrying out border controls also inside the borders, e.g. at main traffic routes, train stations and in large cities. The border, instead of coming down, has virtually penetrated the states. This development was accompanied by an increased interest in mostly biometric identity management of the states. In the SIS, data of non-EU citizens were stored on a large-scale basis, and the EURODAC-data base was another step toward the biometric recording of asylum seekers in the wake of the Dublin Convention. Research in further biometric techniques (iris, facial recognition) is being carried out and will be implemented in ‘forgery-proof’ identification. At the moment, the threat of terrorism is mostly cited as the reason, but terrorism and migration have always been easy to lump together and, as mentioned above, Frontex contributes to several biometric research projects.

Another development can best be described as a punctuation of the interior by the border. I refer to the countless refugee camps; though located in Europe, their inmates and residents nonetheless are subject to a clear exclusion from European society. Much has been written about the accommodation of refugees in camps, and a Migreurop map of 2005 shows that the camps have become present in the whole of Europe (Migreurop 2005). Along with detention and detention centres, the territory of the EU is covered with a network of places that are not extra-territorial but are on no account part of a territory of justice, freedom and security.

On the border: management, improvisation, technology
In the previous chapter, the mechanism of de-territorialisation of the border was described. Now I will analyse how this concept of border/ border territory is reflected in the work and approach of Frontex. This essentially entails dealing with the identity of Frontex – the question of whether Frontex can be compared to the German federal police of the 1990s, just at European level, or whether the increasing de-territorialisation of the border has become reflected in Frontex. This is also basically a question regarding the future of Frontex. Here the term ‘border regime’ must be mentioned, which, in contrast to a monolithic image of ‘border’ such as the term ‘fortress Europe’ often implies, refers to the juxtaposition and opposition of institutions and actors. In the field of European border-security and migration policy there are many such actors and institutions, and the question is whether Frontex, which is protected specifically by European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security Frattini at the moment, will be able to assert itself in future.

The talk given by the executive director of Frontex, Illkaa Laitinen, at the BKA autumn meeting in 2006, is particularly revealing (Laitinen 2006). Apart from claiming to deal with the whole border management in future, the speech, titled ‘Fields of Action and Conceptual Approaches of Integrated European Border Security (European Border Guard?)’, contains a four-level concept of border management according to established Frontex’ modus operandi. The visa system operates far beyond the EU borders and there is cooperation with consulates/ embassies, immigration liaison officers of border security agencies and transport agencies. Frontex considers necessary the cooperation between border security forces on operational basis around the border. The classical business of border security is only directly carried out on the border, since this is where the importance of surveillance, border controls and systematic risk analysis is emphasized. Within the borders, further cooperation between member states, migration control, and deportations in turn are fields of action for Frontex. This four-level concept clearly indicates that Frontex does not see itself as a classical border security authority but wants to also be active on both sides of the border. In particular, the category ‘around the border’ indicates the concept of a border territory that Frontex regards as its traditional field of operation.

Another indicator is the integrated border management which Frontex is said to follow. ‘Integrated’ here points at a much more holistic approach to border security. In the context of this text, the word ‘management’, however, is much more interesting, since it refers to a specific practice of border security. Classically, a border security authority would understand its task rather as administrating or securing a border. The term ‘management’ carries two meanings. First, it implies a clearly neoliberal understanding of the work process, which, drawing on risk analysis, best practice, evaluation and pilot projects could stem from a business-managemant handbook. The other meaning seems to be an admission that a border cannot be under the total control of a border security authority, that there will always arise specific situations, in which management methods are necessary to react in a flexible way. This explains the significance of risk analysis within the work of Frontex as well as the extensive claim for control and knowledge that Frontex makes, which begins far beyond the border and does not stop at the border. Incidentally, Frontex’ understanding of the border’s tendency to ungovernableness is not necessarily an admission of an autonomy of migration of whatever character, but can also be read as knowledge of the internal construction of the border regime. To distinguish itself from other actors and highlight its own work, Frontex presents itself as a special team that in specific situations falls out of the sky in the form of RABITs and helps the national border security authorities out. Thus, the unpredictability of the border legitimizes the existence of Frontex.

The ficticious scenario of the first exercise of a RABIT in November 2007 in Porto, Portugal, is revealing: The sudden massive increase of the number of immigrants from a ficticious collapsing Central American state who are provided with forged visa or other documents from a forgery ring can no longer be handled by the national border security authority. Frontex sends personnel that are trained in recognizing forged documents and help carry out the border controls. Farfetched or not, the scenario reflects that Frontex does not necessarily conceptualize the RABITs as martial border-security special forces, but rather as expert teams who intervene strategically and are indispensable to react to new threats posed by migration.

The frequent emphasis on cooperation with OLAF, the European anti-corruption authority, is also to be read as knowledge on the character of the border. This is because even Frontex has to be conscious that a permeability of the border is often the result of corrupt practices of border security authorities or officials. In this context, cooperation with OLAF is a reliable method to facilitate and assert their own line of uncompromising border security. Speaking of ungovernableness and unpredictability of the border, I have to add that Frontex regards this rather as a challenge to be faced than as a reason for a basic re-orientation (which would have to take place on a much higher level of the EU) – hence the enormous trust that Frontex places in highly technologized borders, biometric systems and scientific risk analysis.

It cannot be denied that this image stands in sharp contrast to the common external image of Frontex. Yet in this context we should always keep in mind that Frontex is a very young actor in the field of border management. Certainly, the policy of open communication in the missions ‘Hera’ and ‘Nautilus’ is partly the result of the necessity to make known the brand Frontex above all as an agency that acts. Nonetheless, Frontex, as demonstrated here, follows a much more differentiating strategy, determent being only one of its facets.

Frontex’ task is to protect the EU territory, conceptualized as a territory of justice, freedom and security, from migration. The central paradox is that the isolation of such a territory creates a border territory that does not know justice, freedom or security, but where extra-territorial camps can be found, along with militarized border security forces that hunt down migrants, where a right to asylum exists only nominally and is denied much too often and where people die on a daily basis on their way to Europe. Taking into consideration an EU policy that speaks of the right to asylum but really means fortification, and an agency that speaks of saving people who are ship-wrecked and in reality increases the risk of death, this further paradox may not be surprising. The extension of this territory of injustice and insecurity to both the interior and the exterior of the border must be a definite incentive for action, because a re-consideration of EU-migration policy has long been overdue but will not happen on its own account. The system always thinks in its own logic. And according to this logic, Frontex is yet another step in the creation of a deadly European-style border regime.